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When playing games in groups, it is an advantage for individuals to have accurate statistical
information on the strategies of their opponents. Such information may be obtained by remembering
previous interactions. We consider a rock-scissors-paper game in which agents are able to recall their
last m interactions, used to estimate the behaviour of their opponents. At critical memory length,
a Hopf bifurcation leads to the formation of stable limit cycles. In a mixed population, agents
with longer memories have an advantage, provided the system has a stable fixed point, and there is
some asymmetry in the payoffs of the pure strategies. However, at a critical concentration of long
memory agents, the appearance of limit cycles destroys their advantage. By introducing population
dynamics that favours successful agents, we show that the system evolves toward the bifurcation
point.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,05.10.Ln
I. INTRODUCTION
“The wise can learn from their enemies” [1], and how
they do this is an interesting question. The mathemat-
ical analysis of competitions between opponents, called
“the theory of games”, began with von Neumann [2] and
Nash [3]. This early work concerned the equilibria of
games, where no agent has anything to gain by changing
strategy [4]. The question of if, and how, game players
reach an equilibrium has been the subject of a great deal
of work since. The dynamics of games can have different
driving mechanisms. In “evolutionary game theory” [5],
devised by John Maynard Smith in 1973, agents (living
organisms) whose strategies are effective against competi-
tors survive and reproduce more rapidly. This replicates
their genes, and strategies they encode, in higher concen-
tration in future generations. The “replicator equations”
which describe this process have applications in diverse
scientific settings from the evolution of language [6] to
behavioural dynamics and decision making [7]. Alter-
natively, death and reproduction need not be involved
if agents are able to learn from experience. An early
example of such a learning rule is “fictitious play” [8]
where players believe that their opponents are choos-
ing strategies at random from a stationary distribution.
They build a progressively clearer picture of this ficti-
tious distribution through repeated interactions and at
each round play the best response. The rule has an obvi-
ous flaw in that the real distribution is non-stationary.
An alternative, derived from psychology, is reinforce-
ment learning [9] of which an an example is “experience
weighted attraction” [10]. Here, actions that have proved
successful in the past are played more frequently. In the
context of cyclic competition, this can give rise to a wide
range of competitive and cooperative behaviours, includ-
ing quasiperiodicity, limit cycles, intermittency and chaos
[11]. If agents learn by sampling a finite number of their
opponents’ moves between strategy updates, the noise
inherent in these samples has been shown [12] to lead
to noise-sustained cycling or removal of periodic orbits
present in the limit of infinite sample size. The processes
of sampling in between strategy updates is referred to as
“batch learning”.
In this paper we introduce learning dynamics in which
agents possess a simple form of finite memory for their
previous interactions. They use this to predict the
current best pure strategy, adjusting their probabilis-
tic strategy after each new interaction. Each agent’s
memory acts as a sample used for “online learning” as
opposed to batch learning, and this distinction is cen-
tral to the effects we uncover. We use our learning rule
to investigate the children’s game of rock-scissors-paper
where rock blunts scissors, scissors cut paper, and pa-
per wraps rock. The three strategies cyclically dominate
each other [13], a situation which can arise in nature.
For example, male side-blotched lizards [14] adopt one
of three mating strategies: ultra-dominant with a large
territory, mate guarding in a small territory or sneaker
without territory, mating opportunistically. Dominant
lizards beat guarders, but are vulnerable to sneakers,
whereas guarders beat sneakers, creating a cyclical com-
petition and oscillations in the frequencies of the three
strategies. Cyclic competition can also arise in sociolog-
ical contexts [15]. When the rock-scissors-paper game is
studied using the replicator equations, the dynamics lack
stable limit cycles. Depending on the values of payoffs
for winning or losing, the system exhibits one of three
kinds of behaviour: stable coexistence, neutrally stable
cycles, or cycles of increasing amplitude [16]. The first
result we present is to show that in our memory based
learning dynamics, limit cycles can form at critical mem-
ory length via a Hopf bifurcation [17]. The appearance
of such cycles, also created by a Hopf bifurcation, has
recently been discovered in the replicator equations, pro-
vided that mutations from one strategy to another [18],
or more complex patterns of mutation [19] are allowed.
In contrast to this work, due to the memory present in
our system, our dynamics is most naturally described by
delay equations.
The neurological mechanisms by which humans and
2animals remember information are not completely un-
derstood [20], but it is clear that there are multiple types
of memory, and memory systems [21]. Broadly speaking,
memories fall into two classes: they are either explicit
recollections of events or facts - “declarative” memories
- or learned motor or social skills and social conditioning
[20]. Our agents are endowed with a simple, finite declar-
ative memory for interactions, but our analysis could be
repeated with other models of memory, or an empirical
“forgetting curve” [22] which describes how memory de-
cays with time. Our current aim is to investigate how the
length of an agent’s memory can influence their individ-
ual effectiveness, and the dynamics of the game. In com-
mon with earlier investigations of the use of sampling to
determine strategy updates [12], we find that sample size
(memory length), which determines the strength of noise
in the data, has a powerful effect. After demonstrating
the appearance of limit cycles, we investigate how re-
duced noise aids decision making. Because each agent’s
memory includes both recent and older behaviour, then
strategy updates are made based on slightly out-of-date
information. Provided that strategy adjustments are suf-
ficiently small or, equivalently, memory is not too long,
then the game has a stable fixed point, and agents with
long memories fare better than their short memory coun-
terparts; their prediction of the best strategy is subject to
smaller random errors. However, the limit cycles which
appear when long memory agents are in high enough con-
centration destroy their competitive advantage.
II. MODEL DEFINITION
We study the zero sum rock-scissors-paper game, with
payoff matrix


R S P
R 0 α −γ
S −α 0 β
P γ −β 0

. (1)
The game is played in continuous time by L ≥ 2 agents
who interact using random pairings which occur at rate
L/2 per unit time so that each agent experiences, on
average, one interaction per unit time. Formally, the
probability that a single pairing takes place in time δt is
Lδt/2+o(δt). Agents each adopt a probabilistic strategy
which, for agent i ∈ {1, . . .  L}, after the nth interaction is
written [ri, si]n, where ri, si and 1−ri−si are the proba-
bilities of playing, respectively, rock, scissors or paper at
the next interaction. Each agent is able to recall his last
m interactions, producing a sample from the population
of strategies {R,S} where R and S are the numbers of
rock and scissors interactions in his memory. Note that
at any given time, both samples {R,S} and strategies
[ri, si]n require only two parameters for their description.
Agents estimate the current average probability
weights of their opponents as the fractions in their cur-
rent sample, and use this to discern the optimal strategy.
Rock
Scissors
Paper
Βm
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Α + Β + Γ
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S
FIG. 1. Domains in which each of the three strategies are
assessed to be the best.
From the form of the payoff matrix (1), we see that the
optimal strategy is determined by which of the following
domains the current sample lies
DR :=
{
S >
γm
α+ β + γ
,R >
(β + γ)m
α+ β + γ
− S
}
(2)
DS :=
{
R <
βm
α+ β + γ
,R <
(β + γ)m
α+ β + γ
− S
}
(3)
DP :=
{
R >
βm
α+ β + γ
, S <
γm
α+ β + γ
}
. (4)
These domains are illustrated in Figure 1. At each point
in time, each agent’s memory defines the position of a
random walker in the simplex {(R,S)|R+ S ≤ m}, with
each new interaction determining the next step of the
walk. After each step an agent will update his strategy
according to the domain in which its memory lies, using
the following rule
[ri, si]n+1 = (1− ǫ)[ri, si]n + ǫ


[1, 0] if (R,S) ∈ DR
[0, 1] if (R,S) ∈ DS
[0, 0] if (R,S) ∈ DP .
(5)
For certain combinations of payoffs and memory length,
(R,S) can lie on the boundary between two domains, in
which case no update is made. The parameter ǫ ∈ [0, 1],
the “update rate”, describes the sensitivity of agents to
new information, and n indexes the number of inter-
actions. According to definition (5), the current strat-
egy is an exponential moving average of the strategies
which were estimated to be optimal from past interac-
tions. Our learning rule has some commonality with ex-
perience weighted attraction rules used in recent studies
[10, 12] where a parameter analogous with our ǫ is used
to describe how rapidly agents respond to new informa-
tion. In these studies, the parameter is interpreted as a
measure of memory in the learning process, because it
determines how much weight is given to previous infor-
mation. Using this interpretation, our model may be seen
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FIG. 2. Probability weights of rock (open circles), scissors
(dots) and paper (squares) agents in a group of size L = 100
with α = 2, β = γ = 1. All agents have memory m = 100
and update rate ǫ = 5 × 10−4. Dashed lines show solutions
to delay equations (28) and (29) using the same parameter
values.
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FIG. 3. Probability weights of rock (open circles), scissors
(dots) and paper (squares) agents in a group of size L = 100
with α = 2, β = γ = 1. All agents have memory m = 100 and
update rate ǫ = 10−3. Dashed lines show solutions to delay
equations (28) and (29) using the same parameter values.
as containing two kinds of memory: an “active” memory -
the recent sample - used for decision making, and a “pas-
sive” memory which equally weights all previous samples
in the limit ǫ → 0 and only uses the most recent when
ǫ = 1. We note also that our rule, in common with fic-
titious play [8], implicitly assumes that agent’s samples
are drawn from a stationary distribution.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Single memory length
We begin by considering the behaviour of a population
of agents, all of whom have the same memory length and
update rate. In order to explore the dynamics of the
population, we observe the average probability weights
associated with each strategy. For example, the weight
associated with rock is
r(t) :=
1
L
L∑
i=1
ri(t) (6)
with s(t) and p(t) defined similarly. The evolution of
the total probability weights in a population with up-
date rate ǫ = 5 × 10−4 and memory m = 100 is shown
in Figure 2. Initial oscillations decay, eventually leaving
the system in a stable state. The strategies of individ-
uals in the population track the curves in Figure 2, but
with a greater stochastic component. In Figure 3 we have
increased the rate to ǫ = 10−3, and we see that stable os-
cillations have formed. For given memory length, these
appear when the update rate is sufficiently large. Con-
versely, for given update rate, stable oscillations emerge
when the memory length is sufficiently large. We will
show later that it is the product ǫm2 which must exceed
a critical value for stable oscillations to appear. This
transition from stable equilibrium to stable oscillations
at critical parameter values is known as a “Hopf Bifur-
cation” [17].
B. Agents as statisticians
The memory of each agent represents a sample from
a time varying population, which is used to estimate
the current properties of the population. It is the fact
that the sample is not drawn from the current popula-
tion which allows oscillations to form. Since the primitive
method used by our agents to estimate strategy fractions
plays a role in destabilizing the fixed point, it is interest-
ing to compare it to more sophisticated methods in order
to determine its plausibility as the choice of an agent with
some degree of “common sense”, assuming he can recall
the times at which the interactions in his sample took
place. We do not formally address the question of which
estimation technique would be selected by rational agents
with unlimited intellectual resources.
In the same way that the method of regression is used
to estimate, by maximum likelihood, the values of con-
tinuous explanatory variables given a sample of contin-
uous response variables, so logistic regression [23] pro-
duces estimates when the response variables are discrete.
The explanatory variables in our system are the collec-
tive time varying strategies of the group, whereas the
response variables are the sequences of observations of
strategy types that each agent makes. In order to investi-
gate how logistic regression compares against our agents’
naive approach, as a technique for estimating the current
strategy weights, we will use it to estimate the current
rock weight given a finite memory sample.
Letting tik be the time at which agent i experiences his
kth interaction back from the current time, and IR(i, k)
be the indicator function that this interaction is with a
rock agent, then the likelihood of his current memory will
4be
Li :=
m∏
k=1
r(tik)
IR(i,k)[1− r(tik)]1−IR(i,k). (7)
We now suppose that during the period of time covered
by the agent’s memory, the rock probability weight may
be expressed as a logistic function
r(t) =
1
1 + e−(β0+β1t)
(8)
where β0 and β1 are constants. It is straightforward to
carry out higher order regression where the exponent in
the denominator is replaced with a polynomial of higher
order. However, the length of time covered by agents’
memory will typically be significantly shorter than the
period of oscillation, so that r(t) changes in an approx-
imately linear way whilst their samples are being col-
lected. For example the period of oscillation in Figure 3
is T ≈ 1375 whereas the memory length is m = 100, and
the greatest change in r(t) during a single time interval
of length 100 is 0.016. We later demonstrate that the ra-
tio of the period of stable oscillations to memory length
obeys
T
m
∝ √m, (9)
at the point where oscillations begin to form, so that in
systems where agents have longer memories, these mem-
ories cover a relatively shorter fraction of one oscillation.
To determine the values of β0, β1 which maximize the
likelihood Li we express the log likelihood as a function
of these parameters:
lnLi =
m∑
k=1
IR(i, k)[β0 + β1tik] (10)
−
m∑
k=1
ln(1 + eβ0+β1tik). (11)
This expression is then numerically maximized to find
the most likely values of β0 and β1 which can then be
used in equation (8) to predict the current value of r(t).
In Figure 4 we see the results of this method, applied
to the memory of a single randomly chosen agent from
the simulation in Figure 3. Also shown are the results
of the primitive estimation method used by our agents.
The primitive method appears considerably more effec-
tive at accurately predicting the current weights. How-
ever, a subtle phase shift may be perceived in the agent’s
predictions relative to the true values. In order to in-
vestigate this shift, and to compare the two methods
in greater detail we construct a fictitious sequence of
Bernoulli random variables {Xk}mk=1 with success prob-
ability, p(k), which changes over the course of the se-
quence: p(k) = p0 + (p1 − p0)k/m. We then use our two
methods to find an estimate pˆ1 of the value of p1, for a
very large number of example sequences, allowing us to
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FIG. 4. Dashed line shows the rock weight in a group of size
L = 100 with α = 2, β = γ = 1. All agents have memory
m = 100 and update rate ǫ = 10−3. Open circles show bi-
nomial logistic regression estimates of the rock fraction made
using the memory of a single randomly selected agent at a
sequence of regularly spaced intervals. Black dots show simi-
lar estimates made by simply computing the fraction of rock
interactions in the agent’s memory.
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FIG. 5. Given a sequence {Xk}
m
k=1 where m = 100, of
Bernoulli random variables with changing success probability
p(k) = p0+(p1−p0)k/m where p0 = 0.2, p1 = 0.25. Black dots
show the estimated probability density function of the logis-
tic regression estimator pˆ1, having mean 0.256 and root mean
squared error 0.07. Open circles show the estimated proba-
bility distribution of the number of successes in the sequence,
serving as an alternative estimator for p1, having mean 0.225
and root mean squared error 0.07.
estimate the distribution of pˆ1. In Figures 5 and 6 we
have constructed distributions for pˆ1 in cases m = 100
and m = 20. It is clear that logistic regression produces
estimates with much higher variance, but with smaller
bias. Whilst the primitive method is the more efficient
estimator, in the sense that the mean squared error in
its predictions is smaller, its bias creates a systematic
delay in its predictions. For larger memory values this
bias will reduce, because the period of oscillation grows
faster than the memory length, so the weights change by
a smaller amount over the course of each agent’s memory.
5FIG. 6. Given a sequence {Xk}
m
k=1 where m = 20, of
Bernoulli random variables with changing success probabil-
ity p(k) = p0 + (p1 − p0)k/m where p0 = 0.2, p1 = 0.3. Light
gray histogram gives estimated probability distribution of the
logistic regression estimator pˆ1, having mean 0.33 and root
mean squared error 0.2. Dark gray histogram gives estimated
probability distribution of the number of successes in the se-
quence, having mean 0.25 and root mean squared error 0.1.
0 100 200 300 400 500
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Εt
Po
pu
la
tio
n
Fr
ac
tio
n
FIG. 7. Populations of m = 10 (open circles) and m = 100
(dots) agents in system of size L = 200 with update rate
ǫ = 0.01 initially composed of 199 short memory agents and a
single long memory agent. Game parameters are α = 2, β =
γ = 1 and population dynamics parameters are ρ = κ = 10−3.
Also shown in fraction of paper agents (black line), illustrating
how the onset of oscillations coincides with stable equilibrium
between memory lengths.
C. Mixed memory and population dynamics
We now consider the case of a mixed population con-
taining two memory lengths, m ∈ {10, 100}. Intuitively
we expect that agents with longer memories will be at
an advantage because they are able to more accurately
predict the optimal strategy; their estimates of oppo-
nents’ strategies are subject to smaller errors. To inves-
tigate this we introduce some simple population dynam-
ics, based upon an exponential moving average of each
agent’s payoffs. We let vik be the payoff to agent i at his
kth interaction since the start of the game, and define his
moving average, v¯ik, as follows
v¯i,k+1 := (1− ρ)v¯ik + ρvi,k+1. (12)
At each pairwise interaction in the game, with proba-
bility κ ≪ 1, the agent with the lower average payoff
is replaced with a copy of the higher scoring agent and
the total score of the pair shared equally between the
original and its copy. In this way the total payoff in the
population remains at zero. In Figure 7 we show the evo-
lution of the fractions of short and long memory agents
in such a simulation, along with the probability weight
for paper, as a signifier for the presence of oscillations.
Initially we have a single long memory agent, whose de-
scendants reproduce rapidly due to their enhanced abil-
ity to determine the optimal strategy to play. However,
once these long memory agents are in sufficient concen-
tration, they create a limit cycle. The presence of this
cycle gives short memory agents an advantage, because
although their samples have a higher noise, they contain
more recent data. In circumstances of rapid change, older
data becomes irrelevant, and skews the sample of the long
memory agents, leading them to make poorer choices. In
consequence the effectiveness of the two memory lengths
comes into balance. The population sizes undergo noisy
oscillations about the bifurcation point once their collec-
tive strategies begin to oscillate. This indicates that the
bifurcation point is itself a self organized state, driven by
population dynamics.
The fact that the payoffs of the three pure strategies
are not equal is essential in order for long memory play-
ers to have an advantage. Simulations similar to that
illustrated in Figure 7 show that as the payoffs α, β, γ
approach equality, the long memory players do not pros-
per and the self organizing Hopf bifurcation is no longer
present. An intuitive understanding of this may be ob-
tained by considering the effect of shortening the memory
length, which causes individual agents’ samples to per-
form higher variance random walks around the simplex of
Figure 1. As the variance of the walk increases, agents’
predictions of the best strategy are subject to greater
variability, driving their strategies toward the symmetric
case [ 13 ,
1
3 ]. If the game is not symmetric then a small
shift towards the symmetric strategy for short memory
players gives an advantage for longer memory players. In
the symmetric case, this advantage disappears because
the symmetric strategy is optimal.
IV. THEORY
Here we investigate the dynamics of a system of identi-
cal agents as m→∞ and L→∞. The results we obtain
by considering these limits provide excellent approxima-
tions to the behaviour of smaller groups of agents for a
wide range of memory values. In particular we study the
symmetric game, allowing us to discover the analytical
conditions for stability and the period of oscillation.
6A. Individual estimates of optimal strategy
In order to construct equations which describe the dy-
namics of the strategy weights r(t), s(t), p(t), we require
expressions for the probabilities that randomly selected
agents will perceive each of the three strategies as opti-
mal. If the strategy weights are constant then the num-
bers R,S and P = m−R−S of strategy types in a sample
of size m will be trinomially distributed with probability
mass function
f(x, y; r, s) =
m!rxsy(1− r − s)m−x−y
x!y!(m− x− y)! . (13)
In reality, the weights will change while the sample is be-
ing taken, producing a sequence of non-identical trivari-
ate Bernoulli trials. Our aim is to approximate this non-
stationary distribution with the stationary version (13)
having appropriately chosen values of r and s. We will
discover, once our analysis is complete, that the period,
T , of oscillations at the transition to instability satis-
fies T ∝ m3/2. Letting the magnitude of the change in
r(t) over a typical agent’s sample be δr then we see that
δr = O(m−1/2) as m → ∞, with the same behaviour
holding for s(t). Thus the approximation of the sample
distribution with a stationary distribution (13), becomes
increasingly accurate as m becomes large and our ap-
proximation is self consistent.
To calculate the probabilities that each of the strate-
gies ω ∈ {Rock, Scissors, Paper} will appear optimal to
a randomly selected agent, given recent behaviour of r(t)
and s(t) we define indicator functions for the domains
defined in (2), (3) and (4)
Iω(R,S) =
{
1 if (R,S) ∈ Dω
0 otherwise.
(14)
In the limit L → ∞ the interactions of an individ-
ual agent have negligible effect on the weights r(t), s(t),
which evolve deterministically. If we select an agent at
random at time t, then conditional on the history of the
weights {r(u), s(u)|u ≤ t}, the probability that this agent
will perceive ω as optimal is a functional of this history
p˜ω[r, s](t) := E[Iω(R,S)](t). (15)
Here the expectation is taken over the set of interaction
times and types in the agent’s memory. Letting τk be the
time elapsed since the kth interaction back from time t,
we define the following average
〈r〉m := 1
m
m∑
k=1
r(t − τk), (16)
which is a random variable depending on {τk}mk=1. Con-
ditional on the interaction times, we approximate the
non stationary distribution of types with the stationary
distribution f(x, y; 〈r〉m, 〈s〉m). We note that differences
between second moments of this distribution and the true
distribution will be of order δr and δs, and the means
will be identical. In order to average over the interaction
times, we note that for a particular agent, the time inter-
vals between interactions are exponentially distributed.
The distribution function for τk is therefore the Gamma
density
P(τk ∈ [t, t+ δt]) = t
k−1e−t
(k − 1)!δt := γk(t)δt (17)
so that
E[〈r〉m] = 1
m
m∑
k=1
∫ ∞
0
γk(u)r(t− u)du (18)
=
∫ ∞
0
(
m∑
k=1
γk(u)
m
)
r(t − u)du (19)
=
∫ ∞
0
Γ(m,u)
m!
r(t − u)du (20)
:=
∫ ∞
0
gm(u)r(t − u)ds (21)
where Γ is the incomplete gamma function, defined as
Γ(m,u) =
∫ ∞
u
xm−1e−xdx. (22)
Equation (21) defines a probability density gm(s) hav-
ing the shape of a smoothed top hat (uniform) distribu-
tion on [0,m], and may be thought of as representing the
strength of the collective memory of all agents u time
units before the present. As m → ∞, the distribution
of 〈r〉m becomes increasingly sharply peaked about its
mean so
E[f(x, y; 〈r〉m, 〈s〉m)] ∼ f(x, y;E[〈r〉m],E[〈s〉m]) (23)
where the expectation is taken over interaction times.
Defining r¯m := E[〈r〉m] then:
p˜ω[r, s](t) ∼
m∑
x=0
m∑
y=0
f(x, y; r¯m, s¯m)Iω(x, y) (24)
:= pω(r¯m, s¯m) (25)
asm→∞. Notice that the quantity pω(r¯m, s¯m) is a func-
tional only because the time averages r¯m, s¯m are func-
tionals, whereas pω(·, ·) is an ordinary function.
B. Delay equation
During a short finite time interval [t, t+ δt], given the
history {r(u), s(u)|u ≤ t}, from the learning rule (5) the
expected changes in weights will be
E[δr] = ǫ[pR(r¯m, s¯m)− r(t)]δt (26)
E[δs] = ǫ[pS(r¯m, s¯m)− s(t)]δt. (27)
7As L→∞, these changes become deterministic and the
weights obey the following coupled delay equations
dr
dt
= ǫ[pR(r¯m, s¯m)− r] (28)
ds
dt
= ǫ[pS(r¯m, s¯m)− s]. (29)
Solutions to these equations are shown in Figures 2 and 3,
where we see that they accurately capture the simulated
evolution of a system with the same parameter values.
C. Linear Stability Analysis for Symmetric Case
In order to understand the conditions under which sta-
ble oscillations form, we examine the stability of the fixed
point of equations (28) and (29). By considering the sys-
tem in the symmetric case where α = β = γ = 1, we
can derive analytical results which provide a qualitative
understanding of the system in general. The fixed point
of the system in the symmetric case is (r, s) = (13 ,
1
3 ).
As m → ∞, the trinomial distribution (13) becomes
increasingly well approximated by a bivariate normal dis-
tribution [24] having the same means µR = mr, µS = ms,
variances σ2R = mr(1−r), σ2S = ms(1−s) and correlation
ρ = −(mrs)/(σRσS). By defining the parameter,
z =
(x − µR)2
σ2R
+
2ρ(x− µR)(y − µS)
σRσS
+
(y − µS)2
σ2S
(30)
we can write this bivariate normal density as:
φ(x, y)dxdy =
exp
[
− z(x,y)2(1−ρ2)
]
2πσRσS
√
1− ρ2 dxdy. (31)
We can derive analytical approximations for the function-
als pR(r¯m, s¯m) and pR(r¯m, s¯m), defined in (24) and (25),
by integrating this density over the domains Dω. In the
symmetric case this task may be achieved by introducing
new variables [19] (X,Y ), related to (x, y) as follows
x =
m
3
+X − Y√
3
(32)
y =
m
3
+
2Y√
3
. (33)
We write the transformed density φ˜(X,Y ; r, s) so that
φ(x, y)dxdy = φ˜(X,Y ; r, s)dXdY . Integrals of the den-
sity over the domains are tractable if the population
fractions are (r, s) = (13 ,
1
3 ) so that the peak of the bi-
variate normal coincides with the vertex where the do-
mains meet (see Figure 1), which is also the fixed point
of the system in the symmetric case. We can exploit this
tractability by expressing φ˜(X,Y ; r, s) as a perturbation
of φ˜(X,Y ; 13 ,
1
3 ). We first write the population fractions
as perturbations about the fixed point
r =
1
3
+ ψr (34)
s =
1
3
+ ψs (35)
where ψr and ψs are small fluctuations. We then define
the following ratio
h(X,Y ;ψr, ψs) :=
φ˜(X,Y ; 13 + ψr,
1
3 + ψs)
φ˜(X,Y ; 13 ,
1
3 )
(36)
which tends to unity as ψr, ψs → 0. The first Taylor
polynomial of h about ψr = ψs = 0 is
h1(X,Y ;ψr, ψs) = 1 +
6X
(
m−√3Y )
m
ψr
+
6m
(
X +
√
3Y
)− 9X2 − 6√3XY + 9Y 2
2m
ψs. (37)
The density φ˜(X,Y ; r, s) therefore has the following
asymptotic behaviour, as ψs, ψr → 0
φ˜(X,Y ; r, s) ∼ h1(X,Y ;ψr, ψs)3e
− 3(X
2+Y 2)
m
mπ
. (38)
We now transform to polar coordinates X = u cos θ, Y =
u sin θ, and make use of the fact that in these coordinates
the domains are symmetrical with angular width 2pi3 . For
example DR = {(u, θ)|θ ∈ [0, 2π/3]}. By integrating over
these domains and defining time averaged fluctuations:
ψ¯r(t) :=
∫ ∞
0
gm(u)ψr(t− u) (39)
we obtain the following linearized expressions for pR and
pS :
pR(ψ¯r, ψ¯s) =
1
3
+
3(2
√
mπ −√3)
8π
ψ¯r +
3
√
m
2
√
π
ψ¯s (40)
pS(ψ¯r, ψ¯s) =
1
3
− 3
√
m
2
√
π
ψ¯r − 3(2
√
mπ +
√
3)
8π
ψ¯s. (41)
We can verify the quality of these approximations by
comparing the expansion coefficients to the exact values
of the derivatives of pω(r, s) evaluated at (r, s) = (
1
3 ,
1
3 ),
as shown in Figure 8. The linearized delay equations (28)
and (29) may then be expressed in terms of the expansion
coefficients:
a(m) :=
3(2
√
mπ −√3)
8π
(42)
b(m) :=
3
√
m
2
√
π
(43)
c(m) :=
3(2
√
mπ +
√
3)
8π
(44)
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FIG. 8. The derivatives ∂pR
∂r
, ∂pS
∂s
, ∂pR
∂s
, ∂pS
∂r
evaluated di-
rectly from equation (24) at (r¯m, s¯m) = (
1
3
, 1
3
). The four
derivatives are plotted using open circles, filled circles, open
squares, filled squares respectively. Black lines show corre-
sponding expansion coefficients from equations (40) and (41).
as follows
ψ˙r(t)
ǫ
=
∫ ∞
0
[aψr(t− u) + bψs(t− u)] gm(u)du− ψr
(45)
ψ˙s(t)
ǫ
= −
∫ ∞
0
[bψr(t− u) + cψs(t− u)] gm(u)du− ψs
(46)
As m→∞ the weight function gm(u) approaches a step
function
gm(u)→
{
1
m if u ∈ [0,m]
0 otherwise
(47)
and the ratios a(m)2b(m) ,
c(m)
2b(m) → 1+O(m−1/2) so equations
(45) and (46) approach the following simplified form:
ψ˙r(t)
ǫ
=
3
4
√
mπ
∫ t
t−m
[ψr(u) + 2ψs(u)] du− ψr (48)
ψ˙s(t)
ǫ
=
−3
4
√
mπ
∫ t
t−m
[2ψr(u) + ψs(u)] du− ψs. (49)
The symmetry of the system, together with numerical so-
lutions to the full equations, suggests we search for oscil-
latory solutions which differ in phase by 2π/3. We there-
fore make the anstaz ψr(t) = e
λt and ψs(t) = e
2pii
3 ψr(t),
where λ is a complex number. Substitution of these trial
solutions into (48) and (49) yields two identical charac-
teristic equations
λ2 + ǫλ− 3
√
3ǫi
4
√
πm
(1− e−λm) = 0. (50)
The fact that both characteristic equations are identical
justifies our ansatz that pairs of solutions exist which are
identical up to a phase shift. We now write λ = x + iy
and introduce the constant
A :=
3
4
√
3
π
. (51)
The real and imaginary parts of the characteristic equa-
tion may then be written
x2 − y2 + ǫx+ Aǫ√
m
e−mx sin(my) = 0 (52)
2xy + ǫy − Aǫ√
m
[1− e−mx cos(my)] = 0. (53)
For given memory lengthm, provided that ǫ is sufficiently
small, the real part of the solutions to (52) and (53) will
be negative, so the fixed point is stable. As we increase
ǫ, then λ crosses through the imaginary axis, creating a
switch to instability with oscillations of exponentially in-
creasing magnitude. Although the fixed point of the full
dynamics shares this transition to instability, the result-
ing oscillations are bounded, creating a stable limit cycle,
the appearance of which is termed a “Hopf Bifurcation”
[17]. To compute the critical value of the update rate ǫc
we set x = 0 in equation (53) obtaining
1− cos(my)
my
=
1
A
√
m
. (54)
This equation may have multiple roots, corresponding to
different frequencies of oscillation. We may determine
the asymptotic behaviour as m → ∞ of the lowest root
be expanding the left hand side to linear order about
y = 0, and then solving for y, obtaining
y ∼ 8
3
√
π
3
m−
3
2 as m→∞. (55)
Substitution of this result into (52) again with x = 0
yields
ǫc =
256π3/2 csc
(
8
√
pi
3
3
√
m
)
81
√
3m5/2
∼ 32π
27m2
as m→∞. (56)
From this analysis we see that the stability of the fixed
point in the symmetric case depends of the value of the
product ǫm2. Our asymptotic expression for y gives us
the period of oscillation at the Hopf bifurcation point
T =
3
4
√
3πm3. (57)
We now test these predictions numerically, and explore
the non-symmetric case.
D. Numerical tests of stability
We consider the symmetric case first, both by numeri-
cally solving equations (28) and (29) where the probabili-
ties pR and pS are as summations (15) over the trinomial
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FIG. 9. Bold line shows r(t) from the numerical solutions to
equations (28) and (29) in the symmetric case when m = 100
and ǫ = 3×10−4. Thin line show corresponding solution when
ǫ = 5×10−4. Open circles and black dots show corresponding
simulation results in a system of size L = 100.
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FIG. 10. Dependence of the steady state amplitude of r(t)
on ǫ for m = 20 (open markers) and m = 80 (filled mark-
ers). Three different combinations of payoff values (α, β, γ)
were used: (1, 1, 1) [circles], (1.5, 2.5, 1) [squares] and (2, 1, 1)
[triangles]. The vertical dotted line has horizontal coordinate
32π/27, corresponding to the critical value of ǫm2 in the sym-
metric game. L = 500 in all cases.
distribution, and by simulation. We consider the case
m = 100 and in Figure 9 we have plotted r(t) for values
of ǫ lying just above and just below the critical value of
ǫc = 2π/16875 ≈ 3.7 × 10−4 predicted by our stability
analysis. The appearance of stable oscillations is con-
sistent with our analysis. We also numerically compute
the period of oscillation at the critical point, finding that
T ≈ 2347 which compares to our analytical estimate of
T = 740
√
3π = 2302.
We now verify, using simulations, that the appearance
of limit cycles depends on the value of the product ǫm2
in three representative games, each with different payoffs.
For two different memory values, m ∈ {20, 80} we have
numerically determined the amplitude of oscillations in
r(t) for a series of values of ǫ. These amplitudes are plot-
ted in Figure 10 as functions of ǫm2, and we see that the
value ǫm2 effectively predicts the onset of limit cycles at
least at the levels of payoff asymmetry we have studied in
this paper. We note however that we have found the pre-
cise critical value of this product only for the symmetric
case in the limit of large m. From Figure 10 we observe
that the asymmetric payoffs introduce small corrections
to this critical value.
V. CONCLUSION
We have studied the rock-scissors-paper game played
by agents with a simple form of memory. This memory is
used by each agent to estimate the current best strategy.
After each new interaction, agents incrementally update
their own strategy, using a form of online learning. The
naive technique for estimating strategy fractions used by
our agents has, in common with fictitious play [8], the un-
derlying assumption of a stationary distribution of agent
strategies in the population. Although this assumption
is clearly false, we have shown that the technique can act
as a more efficient estimator than logit regression.
Provided the system possesses a stable fixed point,
agents with longer memories are able to more accurately
determine the true weights, and therefore make better
judgements about which strategy to play. However, ex-
cessively long agent memory produces a transition from
stable equilibrium to a limit cycle. We have shown an-
alytically in the symmetric case that the fixed point is
destabilized when ǫm2 reaches a critical value, and that
the period of oscillations at the transition point grows
as m3/2. A simple form of population dynamics, im-
posed on a mixed population of long and short memory
agents demonstrates that the initial advantage afforded
long memory agents is destroyed when they become too
numerous and destabilize the system.
Due to its role as the simplest model of cyclic com-
petition, the rock-scissors-paper game is heavily studied.
Recent work [18, 19] demonstrates how the introduction
of mutations in to the replicator dynamics of the game
can produce simple limit cycles via a Hopf bifurcation
[17] in the replicator equations. We have shown that
stable limit cycles can appear at critical agent memory,
through a Hopf bifurcation in the delay equations which
capture the learning dynamics of the population.
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